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Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018) take issue with the common trope that eyewitness memory is 
inherently unreliable. They draw on a large body of mock-crime research and a small number of 
field studies, which indicate that high-confidence eyewitness reports are usually accurate, at 
least when memory is uncontaminated and suitable interviewing procedures are used. We 
agree with the thrust of Wixted et al.’s argument, and welcome their invitation to confront the 
mass underselling of eyewitnesses’ potential reliability. Nevertheless, we argue there is a 
comparable risk of overselling eyewitnesses’ reliability. Wixted et al.’s reasoning implies that 
near-pristine conditions or uncontaminated memories are normative, but there are at least two 
good reasons to doubt this. First, psychological science does not yet offer a good understanding 
of how often and when eyewitness interviews might deviate from best-practice in ways that 
compromise the accuracy of witnesses’ reports. Second, witnesses may frequently be exposed to 
pre-interview influences that could corrupt reports obtained in best-practice interviews. 
  





Reasons to Doubt the Reliability of Eyewitness Memory: Commentary on Wixted, Mickes, and 
Fisher (2018) 
Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018) challenge the common trope that eyewitness memory 
is inherently unreliable (here, we use reliable/unreliable in the everyday sense, i.e., to be 
dependable/undependable). Recollections are indeed malleable, they acknowledge, and can be 
readily contaminated by improper interviewing techniques. But Wixted et al. assert that these 
facts should not lead us to characterize eyewitness reports as an unreliable form of forensic 
evidence. To support this assertion, they draw on mock-crime research and a small number of 
field studies, which indicate that high-confidence eyewitness reports are usually accurate, at 
least when memory is uncontaminated and suitable interviewing procedures are used. We 
agree with the thrust of Wixted et al.’s argument, and welcome their invitation to confront the 
mass underselling of eyewitnesses’ potential reliability. Nevertheless, there is a comparable risk 
of overselling eyewitnesses’ reliability.  
As we see it, Wixted et al.’s (2018) position is wholly compatible with the more common 
characterization of eyewitness memory as unreliable. The compatibility of these positions hinges 
on the base-rate of “pristine conditions” (or at least near-pristine conditions wherein initial 
memory is uncompromised; Mickes, Clark, & Gronlund, 2017) in real-world eyewitness 
interviews. If near-pristine conditions are rare, then both the common trope and Wixted et al.’s 
characterization are plausibly correct.  
Wixted et al.’s (2018) reasoning implies that near-pristine conditions or uncontaminated 
memories are normative, but we doubt this. To consider why, we must look to psychological 
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science for answers to two questions. First, how often do eyewitness interviews deviate from 
best-practice and compromise the accuracy of witnesses’ reports?  Second, how often have 
witnesses been exposed to pre-interview influences that could corrupt reports obtained in best-
practice interviews (cf. Poole & Lindsay, 1998)? 
Answering the first question requires a definition of “best-practice.” Wixted and Wells 
(2017), and many others (e.g., Levi & Lindsay, 2001; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & 
Brimacombe, 1998) have sought to define the optimal conditions for eliciting identification 
decisions. Yet current evidence indicates that, despite promising shifts toward more 
widespread adherence, real-world investigators aren’t consistently following these best-practice 
guidelines. For instance, in a survey of over 600 US law enforcement agencies, Loftus and 
Greenspan (2017) found that some best-practice procedures are frequently met (e.g., 
instructions that minimize pressure on witnesses to make positive identifications), whereas 
others are met less than one-third of the time (e.g., the use of double-blind lineups, explicitly 
probing witnesses’ confidence in their identifications).  
Psychology is in a far weaker position to define the optimal conditions for eliciting 
eyewitness descriptions of people or events. To say this is not to ignore the substantial literature 
on best-practices in information-gathering interviews (e.g., Hope, Gabbert, & Fisher, 2011; Poole 
& Lamb, 1998). But we know far less about the confidence-accuracy relationship under these 
different interviewing practices, and less still about how well this relationship holds in real-
world cases. Note also that the method used for calculating the confidence-accuracy 
relationship can affect the assessments made and the conclusions that are drawn.1 Unlike in the 
context of lineup identifications, we also have little evidence on how and when confidence 
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should be measured when witnesses provide narrative descriptions. The practicality and 
effectiveness of assessing confidence on a detail-by-detail basis in real-world interviews is yet to 
be established.  
Even if we could define and guarantee near-pristine interviewing conditions in the real 
world, intra-interview procedures are not the only possible sources of memory contamination. 
Wixted et al. (2018) note that “only the first memory test counts” (p. 12), but how often is the 
official, recorded report the first occasion on which the witness has talked about the event? We 
do not know the answer, but research shows that co-witnesses frequently discuss crime details 
prior to being interviewed (Eisen, Gabbert, Ying, & Williams, 2017; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). 
Moreover, it seems likely that victims of sexual assault and domestic violence often talk to 
medical personnel, friends, or family before they talk to police (Starzynski, Ullman, Filipas, & 
Townsend, 2005). Such discussions can make it difficult to determine the source of crime-
relevant details (e.g., Vredeveldt, Groen, Ampt, & Van Koppen, 2017), and also create 
opportunities for memory contamination.  
Lab studies show that people who receive misinformation are sometimes more confident 
in their erroneous memories than in their veridical memories (Assefi & Garry, 2003; Takarangi, 
Parker, & Garry, 2006), and become increasingly confident in those erroneous memories as 
rehearsal makes them increasingly coherent and rich (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 
2004). Moreover, individuals’ personal goals (Sharman & Calacouris, 2010), social goals 
(Hellmann, Echterhoff, Kopietz, Niemeier, & Memon, 2011), preferences (Gordon, Franklin, & 
Beck, 2005), expectations and stereotypes (Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006), and semantic 
representations (Reyna, 1995) — to name just a few factors — can sometimes shape 
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remembering even in the absence of misinformation. These influences typically occur without 
conscious awareness (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), and therefore justice 
professionals, jurors, and witnesses themselves can seldom know whether or to what extent 
such factors have contaminated a memory. In sum, even if eyewitness recognition and recall are 
reliable when uncontaminated, it is risky to depend on that knowledge without having reliable 
ways of detecting contamination.  
When is reliable, reliable enough? Wixted et al. (2018) claim that recall memory is highly 
reliable, citing evidence that when eyewitnesses report details with high confidence they are 
highly likely to be correct. But is it appropriate to describe witnesses as “reliable” when around 
10% of the information they report with “absolute certainty” in near-pristine conditions is 
incorrect (as in Odinot, Wolters, & van Koppen, 2009)? If witnesses in near-pristine conditions 
are prompted to only answer questions when they are sure, does it make sense to describe these 
witnesses as “reliable” when 9% of their answers are wrong (as in Evans & Fisher, 2011)? 
Wixted et al. are right to note that these witnesses were overwhelmingly accurate, and we agree 
that witnesses have been impugned by common claims that memory is unreliable. Moreover, 
many of the memory errors made by witnesses are likely to have little forensic relevance. But as 
Wixted and colleagues have acknowledged elsewhere, with error-rates of 10% or more, even 
high-confidence memory reports are “simply not a reliable enough indicator of truth to 
unilaterally adjudicate guilt or innocence” (Roediger, Wixted, & DeSoto, 2012, p. 113). Therefore 
to characterize eyewitness memory as inherently reliable could risk leaving judges, juries, and 
investigators with the unwarranted assumption that 100% confidence implies 100% accuracy. 
Indeed, one important difference between eyewitness memory and DNA is that lay decision-
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makers are rarely left to assess the reliability of the latter for themselves (see Thompson & 
Newman, 2015). 
It certainly seems timely to take stock of the robust and growing evidence on the 
confidence-accuracy relationship, and to avoid treating eyewitness memories as specious by 
default. But it would, in our view, be unwise to give the impression that eyewitness reports are 
inherently reliable.  
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1  For comments on analytical techniques for measuring the accuracy-confidence 
relationship, see Gronlund, Wixted, and Mickes (2014); Wells, Yang, and Smalarz, (2015); 
Wixted and Wells (2017); Wixted, Read, and Lindsay (2016); and Juslin, Olsson, and Winman 
(1996). 
